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Summary findings
Hoekman and Mavroidis analyze the new Government
Procuremcnt Agrecment (GPA)that was negotiated
between a subset of General Agrcementon Tariffs and
Trade (GAIT) members in the Uruguay Round, focusing
especiallyon the expansion of coverage to scrvicesand
on the strengthening of enforcement mechanisms.
Covcrage objectiveswere substantially achieved,
although commitmentscontain many exceptions for
services.The transparency of signatories' procurement
practices was enhanced and enforcement provisionswere
strengthened, particularlyby the introduction of a bidwhich allows private
protest challenge mrechanism,
parties (firms) to invoke the Agreement before national
courts. (A potential problem: domestic courts could
produce divergent interpretations of the GPA.)
Unlike most of the other Tokyo Round codes - for
example, the agreemcnts on technical barriers to trade
(standards), import licensing,customs valuation,
subsidies,and antidumping - the GPA could not be

"multilatcralized." Its disciplinesapply only to World
Trade Organization (WTO) members that have signed it.
Public procurement represents a major source of
demand for goods and servicesin most countries.
Getting domestic procurement policies 'right" can
therefore have major effects on welfare. And improving
developing countrics' accessto global procurement
markets could help induce governments to adopt
multilateral rules, if those could be shown to be in their
interests.
Hoekman and Mavroidisexplore why only a limited
number of countries have signed the GPA.They suggest
the pursuit of tariffication as one avenue through which
the Agreement might be expanded to cover all WTO
members. In the process, the GPA could be improved
economicallyby eliminatingcurrent provisionsthat
allow for measures with quota-like effects, and by
weakening incentivesto seek 'absolute" sector-by-sector
reciprocity.

This paper - a product of the PrivateSector and FinanceTeam, Europeand Central Asia,and MiddleEastand North Africa
Regions,TechnicalDepartment- is part of a larger effort in the department to monitoragreementsof interest to the region.
Copies of the paper are availablefree from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,DC 20433. Pleasecontact
Ms. Faten Hatab, room H8-087, extension38535 (22 pages). March 1995.
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Summary
The Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)--originallynegotiated during the Tokyo
Round--was renegotiated for the second time during the Uruguay Round. It is one of the WTO's socalled Plurilateral Agreements, in that its disciplines apply only to those WTO Members that have
signed it. In contrast to most of the other Tokyo Round codes--e.g., the agreements on technical
barriers to trade (standards), import licensing, customs valuation, subsidies, and antidumping--the
GPA could not be 'multilateralized'. With the reintroduction of agriculture and textiles and clothing
into the GATT, procurement has therefore become the major 'hole' in the coverage of the GATT.
The main objective of the GPA has always been--and renains-to subject government
procurement to international competition. To accomplish this objective, the Tokyo Round GPA
extended the GATT obligations of national treatment, MFN and transparency to the tendering
procedures of govermnent entities. The trade-off for such far-reaching obiigations, however, was a
restrictive coverage, insofar as the GPA applies only to those entities included on the schedules
submitted by signatory nations. The renegotiation of the GPA during the Uruguay Round focused on
further expansion of its coverage, strengthening of its enforcement provisions, and addressing the
factcrs perceived by developing countries that inhibited themnfrom signing the Agreement. These
constraints related both to the substantive provisions of the GPA and to the 'conditionality' imposed
by members concerning the entity offers made by nonsignatories when negotiating accession. The
main objectives in terms of coverage were to extend the entity coverage to include sub-central and
quasi-governmental bodies, and to cover procurement of teleconnnunications, heavy electrical and
transportation equipment, as well as government purchases of services.
Negotiators made significant progress with respect to coverage and enforcement, but were not
successful in expanding membership. The coverage objectives were substantially achieved, although
comnmitmentscontain many derogations regarding services. Enforcement provisions were
strengthened, in particular by the introduction of a bid-protest challenge mechanism. These are very
innovative for the GATT-MTN system in that they allow private parties (firms) to invoke the GPA
before national courts. In the process, however, potential problems have been created, due to the
possibility of diverging interpretations of the GPA by domestic courts. Much was done to enhance
transparency of procurement practices of signatories, although further strengthening could be achieved
by requiring that the publication of contract awards (already required) include a brief motivation of
decisions (presently not required).
Membership of the GPA remains limited. Indeed, at the entry into force of the new GPA
there may be fewer signatories than at the beginning of the Uruguay Round. Two of the Parties to
the Tokyo round code did not sign the new GPA. Inducing greater participation through
'multilateralization' of the GPA is the main challenge facing policymakers. Public procurement
constitutes a large source of demand for goods and services in most countries. Getting domestic
procurement policies 'right' therefore can have large welfare effects. At the same time, improving
developing country access to global procurement markets could help to induce Govermnent's to adopt
multilateral rules if these can be shown to be in their interests. Perhaps the most immediate source of
urgency stems from a provision in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which calls
for negotiations on govermnent procurement of services to be initiated within two years of the entry
into force of the WTO (i.e., by January 1997). The rules and procedures that are negotiated will be
important in determining the potential for growth in developing country exports of services.

Pursuitof tarifficationcouldbe an avenuethrough whichmembershipin the GPA can be
expandedin the future. In the process,the GPA could be improvedfrom an economicperspectiveby
eliminatingcurrent provisionsthat allow for measureswith quota-likeeffects,and weakeningthe
incentivesto seek 'absolute' reciprocityon a sector-by-sectorbasis. More generally,research efforts
are requiredto identifypossibleapproachestowards extendingmultilateraldisciplinesfor procurement
of goodsand servicesthat will be beneficialto developingcountries,and thus be helpfulin
formulatingnegotiatingpositionsand strategies. Such researchshouldanalyzein greaterdepth the
economicsof the GPA's mles and disciplines,investigatewhat the impactof the Agreementhas been,
expandthe knowledgeof currentprocurementpolicies in non-membercountries,and quantifythe
importanceof procurementmarketsin major selectedOECD and developingcountries.

Introduction
The Agreement on Government Procurement--originallynegotiated during the Tokyo Round-was
renegotiated for the second time during the Uruguay Round. The new Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA), signed in Marrakesh on April 15, 1994, will enter into force on January 1, 1996.
It is one of the WTO's so-called 'Annex IV' or Plurilateral Agreements, in that its disciplines apply only
to those WTO Members that have signed it.' In contrast to most of the other Tokyo Round codes-e.g.,
the agreements on technical barriers to trade (standards), import licensing, customnsvaluation, subsidies,
and antidumping-the GPA could not be 'multilateralized'. With the reintroduction of agriculture and
textiles and clothing into the GATT, procurement has therefore become the major 'hole' in the coverage
of the GATT.2
The main objective of the GPA has always been-and remains-to subject government procurement
to international competition.3 To accomplish this objective, the Tokyo Round GPA extended the GATT
obligations of national treatment, MFN and transparency to the tendering procedures of government
entities. The trade-off for such far-reaching obligations, however, was a restrictive coverage, insofar as
the GPA applied only to those entities included on the schedules submitted by signatory nations. While
the entity coverage was somewhat limited initially, it wascontemplated that more entities would be added
as the result of the periodic renegotiations called for in the Agreement.
Given the sensitive nature of procurement decisions and a tradition of buy national policies
prevalent in many signatories, it is not surprising that during the first few years of implementation
sigr .ttories notified numerous instances of noncompliancein GATT Committee meetings. Inadequacies
in publishing tender notices, maintaining response deadlines too short for bid submissions, and not
notifying unsuccessful bidders were some of the issues that were discussed. Although some of these
problems were of a start-up nature, practices found objectionableto certain countries appeared with some
regularity on the agenda of Committee meetings. Examples included the use of noncompetitive
procurement procedures such as single tendering (asking only one firm to submit a bid) and the practice
by some countries of splitting large contracts into smaller lots so as to fall below the threshold minimum

1/ Membershipof the GPA is only open to WTO Members. Signatoriesto the new GPA are Austria, Canada,
the EU, Finland,Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway.Sweden,Switzerland,and the UnitedStates.
2/ Thereare four plurilateralagreements:the GPA, the civil aircraft agreement,and the arrangementson
bovinemeat and dairyproducts. As the civil aircraftagreementencompassesmost producers,the lack of
multilateralizationhas no seriousimplications. See Jackson(1989)and Hoelkmanand Stem (1993)for a
discussionof the codes.
See Bourgeois(1982)and Hoekmanand Stem (1993)for a descriptionand discussionof the Tokyo Round
Agreement. lhe followingparagraphsdraw in part from Hoekmanand Stem (1993).
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specified in the code. Because noncompliance is often difficult to detect, there are inherently problems
in monitoring the implementation of the GPA and enforcing its rules. Of particular importance was the
absence of a timely bid protest mechanism in the Tokyo round code, or an adequate remedy if a GATT
dispute settlement panel were to find in the favor of a complainant.
The GPA initially exempted purchases with a value of less than Special Drawing Rights (SDR)
150,000. This was lowered to SDR 130,000 during the first renegotiation of the GPA--initiated in 1983,
with the results entering into force in February 1988. The amended 1988 Agreement also extended
coverage to rental and leasing contracts, increased the time allowed for bid submission, and required the
publication of information on winning bids. The second renegotiation of the GPA during the Uruguay
Round focused on further expansion of its coverage, strengthening of its enforcement provisions, and
addressing the factors perceived by developing countries that inhibitedthem from signing the Agreement.
These constraints related both to the substantive provisions of the GPA and to the 'conditionality' imposed
by members concerning the entity offers made by nonsignatories when negotiating accession. ',Themain
objectives in terms of coverage were to extend the entity coverage to include sub-central and
quasi-governmental bodies, and to cover procurement of telecomununications, heavy electrical and
transportation equipment, as well as government purchases of services. Negotiators made significant
progress with respect to coverage and enforcement, but were not successful in expanding membership.
The objective of this paper is to provide an analysis of the new GPA, taking both a legal and
policy perspective. Section IT provides a succinct description of the main provisions of the new GPA,
highlighting major differences with the 1988 Agreement.4 Section m discusses the new GPA's most
innovative feature: its enforcement and dispute settlement provisions. Section IV turns to the issue of
why membership of the GPA remains so limited; indeed, it actually declined as two countries-Hong
Kong and Singapore-have not signed it. Section V concludes.

II.

The GPA

The objectives of the GPA are stated in the Preamble: contribute to greater liberalization and
expansion of world trade; eliminate discrimination among foreign products/services or foreign suppliers;
and enhance the transparency of relevant laws and practices. The Tokyo Round Agreement included a
provision (Article IX:6(b)) that called for periodic negotiationsto broaden and inprove the GPA on the
basis of mutual reciprocity. Article IX:6(b) explicitly called for the Committee on Goverrmnent
Procurement (the Committee hereafter) to explore at an early stage the possibilities of expanding the

41Blank(1994)and Messerlin(1994)are complementarysources.
2

coverage of the Agreement to include service contracts.5 A significantbroadening of the Agreement was
achievedduring the Uruguay round. Services and constructionbecame subject to the GPA, and the reach
of the Agreement was extended to sub-centrp3entities.
Article I (Scope and Coverage) states that "this Agreement applies to any law, regulation,
procedure, or practice regarding any procurement by entities covered by this Agreement, as specified in
Annexes 1-5." The concept of 'procurement' covers all contractual options, including purchase, leasing,
rental and hire-purchase, with or without the option to buy. The GPA uses a so-called positive list
approach to determine the reach of the Agreement: it applies only to entities that are listed in an Annex.
There are three 'entity Annexes': Annex I lists covered central govermnent entities; Annex 2 lists subcentral government entities; and Annex 3 lists "all other entities that procure in accordance with the
provisions of this Agreement." Annex 3 is a catch-all category, that includes bodies such as utilities.
Its careful wording allows for the fact that entities that are listed may be partially or totally private.
Indeed, it is noteworthy that the term entity is nowhere defined, reflecting the fact that there was no
consensus on what constitutes a 'public undertaking'. Instead of attempting to agree on a common
definition, a decision was made to maintain significant flexibilityregarding the entities that could be put
on the table (Messerlin, 1994).6 Article 1:3 operates as an anti-circumvention provision: if scheduled
entities require7 enterprises not covered to award contracts in accordance with particular requirements,
the two basic nondiscrimination principles (national treatrnent and MFN) apply mutat.s mutandis.
The entities that are listed in the three Annexes are subjectto the rules and disciplines of the GPA
with respect to their procurement of goods and services it (1) the value of the procurement exceeds
certain specified thresholds;' and (2) the goods or services that are involved are not exempted from the
coverage of the Agreement. Table 1 sets out the various thresholds that apply to the procurement of
goods and services for the three types of entities for each of the Parties to the GPA. Note that there is
some variance between signatories. Only for central govermmentent..ies is there a common minimum
threshold of SDR 130,000 for goods and non-construction services. Thresholds can be as high as SDR
5/ The Committeeis composedof representativesfrom the partiesto the GPA. It providesa forum for the
exchange of information and views, and is the body to which disputes are initially brought.
6/ Article XXIV:6(b) allows for the removal of entities included in one of the Annexes subsequent to "the
effective elimination of government control or influcnce' over the entity. The most common way this might
occur is through privatization. If there is an objection to the removal, dispute settlement procedures may be
invoked. Signatories may explicitly exclude procurement made by entities if there is competition. Thus, e.g.,
Japan has stated in its Annex that "This Agreement shall not apply to contracts which the entities award for
purposes of their daily profit making activities which are exposed to competitive forces in markets."
7/ This term has not been interpreted by a GPA dispute settlement panel, but it seems safe to conclude that it
should be interpreted strictly.
8/ Valuation is to take into account fees, premia, commissions, and indirect taxes. In the case of the EU a
fictive VAT rate of 13 percent must be included (Messerlin, 1994).
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15 million for construction services for non-central government entitics.9 The product coverage of the
Agreement is also determined by the Annexes. As far as goods are concerned, in principle all
procurement is covered, unless specified otherwise in an Annex. Thus, a negative list approach is used
to determine the coverage of the GPA for procurement of non-defense related goods by scheduled
entities."0 The procurement of goods by Defence Ministries or similar entities is often subject to a
positive list: only items explicitly scheduled are covered. Procurement of services is also subject to a
positive list: only the procurement by covered entities of services explicitly scheduled in Annexes 4 and
5 are subject to the GPA's rules, and then only insofar as no qualifications or limitations are maintained
in the relevant Annexes.
Many Parties have made explicit derogations to the commitments that are contained in their
Annexes. These can be divided into two types. The first consists of derogation from the GPA's
nondiscrimination requirement contained in Article 111. These have been made by the majority of
signatories. They generally specify that Party X will not follow the GPA's nondiscrimination rule to the
procurement by entities listed in Annex Yto firms originating in Party R, S, or T "until such time as X
has accepted that the Parties concerned give comparable and effective access for X's undertakings to the
relevant markets. Note that this reflects an explicit requirement of absolute reciprocity on either a
productlservice and/or an entity basis. The second type of derogation pertains to commitments on
services (Annexes 4 and 5), and specifies that services that are listed are covered only to the extent that
other Parties to the GPA have provided reciprocal access to that service. Canada, Finland, Korea,
Switzerland and the United States have made such derogations. The mnixof positive and negative list
approaches for entities and productstservices, varying thresholds, and the use of exceptions and
derogations makes it difficult to ascertain the effective scope of the GPA.
Basic Principles
The two basic principles governing the GPA are non-discrimination and national treatment
(Article III). The way these two principles have traditionally been understood in the GATT-context is
that the former refers to a legal prohibition to discriminate between foreign products; in the GPA-context,
the rationepersonae-component of the obligationstays the same, whereas the ratione nmateriae-component

2/ It shouldalso be noted that the Annexesof individualsignatoriesmay specifyhigher thresholdsfor particular
membersof the GPA in an attempt to ensure reciprocity. For example,althoughthe thresholdfor construction
servicesis SDR5 millionfor the UnitedStates,the U.S. maintainsa SDR 15 millionthresholdfor Korean
firms.
10/ To give someillustrations,Austria, Canada,the EU, Finland,Norway,Swedenexcludeprocurementof
agriculturalproductsmade in the contextof agriculturalsupportprograms;the EU and Switzerlandexempt
contractsby Annex I or 2 entities relatingto drinkingwater, energy,transportand telecommunications;Israel
has exemptedthe procurementof a numberof goodsby its Ministryof Health; Japan has excludedprocurement
of publicelectricaltelecommunicationsequipmentby Annex3 entities;Korea excludesprocurementof satellites
for five years; etc.
4

is extendedto coveralso a positivelist of servicesandsuppliersof productsand/or services. The latter
refers to a legal prohibitionto discrimn
inate, with respv.,tto the aforementionedcategories, between
foreign and domesticsources. The two fundamentalobligationsapply irrespectiveof the customs
treatmentof the productsor servicesthat will affectthe procurementcontract. ArticleM11:3
of the GPA
states to this effectthat the aforementionedprovisions"shallnot applyto customsduties and chargesof
any kind imposedon or in connectionwith importation,the methodof levyingsuch duties and charges,
other import regulationsand formalities, and measures affecting trade in services other than laws,
regulations,proceduresand practices regardinggovermnentprocurementcoveredby this Agreement".
Article III:2 further states that each Party 'shall ensure" that its entities do not discriminate
betweenlocally-established
suppliers "on the basisof degreeof foreignaffiliationor ownership"or 'on
the basis of the countryof productionof the goodor servicebeingsupplied". ArticleI1I:. is new. The
old Agreementspoke only of traded goods. i.e., products originatingwithin the customs territory
(includingfree zones)of Parties. Under the newGPA, the words "originatingwithin .. " were deleted
from III:1, implyingthat it implies to both trade and sales through establishment. Contrary to first
appearances,the additionof Article M11:2
is not redundant,however. A rationalefor the inclusionof
Article M:2 may be that the GATT does not have any agreed rules to determinethe origin of locally
establishedfurms. By includinga blanketprohibitionon discriminationagainstlocallyestablishedfinns,
the need for ascertainingorigin disappears. Articlem incorporatesan obligationof result: signatories
must ensure that the behaviorof coveredentities conformswith the nondiscrininationprinciples. The
means of satisfyingthis obligationare not spelledout. Parties are free to choosewhatevermeans they
deemappropriateto achievethe agreed result. Inactionby signatories,as well as actionto the contrary,
gives adequategroundsto affectedParties for legal proceedingsto be initiated.
Articlem impliesthat policiessuchas offsetsareprohibitedinsofaras they implydiscrimination.
This prohibitionis stated explicitly in Article XVI, whichforbids developedcountriesto use offsets.
However, developingcountriesmay continueto requireoffsets, as long as these are clearly defined,
appliednondiscriminatorily,and are not used as a criterionin awardingcontracts."
The Agreementprovidesfor four methodsof tendering(ArticlesVII and XIV): open, selective,
limited or throughcompetitivenegotiations.
rO)Open tenderingprocedures: Any interestedsupplier may submit a tender. This is the
preferredmethod. However,three other methodsare also allowedfor if a numberof conditions
have been fulfilled. These are:

111That is, thcy can be conditionsthat are specifiedin tenderdocumentation,but a firm cannotbe awardeda
contracton the basis of exceedingthe minimumoffsetrequirementthat is imposed.
5

(ii) Selective tenderitngprocedtures:Only those suppliers invited to do so by the entity may submit
a tender. Entities that desire to have recourse to thcse procedures should maintain lists of
qualified suppliers that will be interested to bid. These lists basically establish eligibility criteria
that have to be fulfilled by applicants that want to figure among the qualified suppliers.
Signatories must publish at least once a year in an agreed publication the lists maintained, their
validity, and the conditions to be satisfied for inclusion, including the methods used by entities
to verify that requirements are met (Article lX:9).
(iii) Lirnited tendering procedures: Under this method an entity contacts suppliers individually.
Article XV of the GPA provides an exhaustive list of justifications for using limited tendering
procedures (previously known as single tendering procedures). These include the absence of
tenders in response to an open or selective tender, cases of urgency, additional deliveries by an
original supplier, or additional construction services not included by intended to be within the
original contract. Limited tendering procedures should not be used 'with a view to avoiding
maximum possible competition or in a manner which would constitute a means of discrimination
among suppliers of other Parties or protection to domestic producers or suppliers".
(iMi)Negotiated procedures: These may be conducted in the context of procurement in which
entities have indicated their intent to do so, or when it appears from the evaluation that no tender
is obviously the most advantageous in terms of the specific evaluation criteria set forth in the
notices or tender documentation. Elimination of participants in this context should be carried out
in accordance with the criteria set forth in the tender documentation. In case of modification of
the criteria, all remaining participants must be accorded an opportunity to submit new offers.
The GPA pays particular attention to ensuring and enhancing transparency. Article IX governs
the opening of the procedures. According to this Article, each entity is obliged to publish an invitation
to participate for all cases of intended procurement, except for the case of limited tendering. Suniunaries
of procurement notices have to be issued in one of the WTO's official languages (English, French or
Spanish). Notices of planned or proposed procurement must pmovidea list of all elements needed to
ensure transparency, including the mode of procurement, its nature and quantity, dates of delivery,
economicand technical requirements, amounts and terms of payment etc. In publication of notices (calls
for tender), entities must make clear that procurement is covered by GPA. Article VI (Technical
Specifications)requires that such specifications are not be adopted with the effect of creating unnecessary
obstacles to international trade, and where appropriate be expressed in terms of performance rather than
design or descriptive characteristics and be based on internationalstandards where such exist. For tenders
to be considered for award, they must comply at the time of the opening with the notices and the
conditions of participation (Artici XIII). While Article VI is not strongly worded--what is a 'necessary
barrier' to trade; what is appropriate?--the challenge procedure discussed below gives this language some
bite.

6

Entities are legally obliged under LheGPA (Article X111:4b)to award contracts to the tenderer
who "has been determined to bc fully capable of undertaking the contract" anid who is (a) either the
lowest tender; or (b) the tender whiclhin terms of the specific evaluation criteria set forthlin the notices
or tender docunientation is detcrmined to be the most advantageous. The first of the two conditions to
be fulfilled requires a tactual deteniinaiion. Sonic margin of discretion by the procuring entities is
allowed for in the scnsc that it involvcs, by dcfinition, judgment by the procuring entities on the capacity
of the tenderer to fulfill the contract. Determination of the lowest tender is in principle unambiguous.
Who best meets the evaluation criteria is opcn to a considerable degree of discretion, however. The
binding constraint is therefore the specific evalua.ion criteria set forth in the notices or tender
documentation. It would be a violai.on of the Agreement were an entity to consider a tender as the most
advantageous on the basis of evaluation criteria that were no: specified in the notices or tender
documentation.
The foregoing requirements do not need to be followed if the procuring entity decides it is in the
public interest not to issue the contract (Article XIII:4(b). This could prove to be an important loophole
in the Agreement since the public interest is nowhere defined in the Agreement. The 'public interest'
clause could allow industrial policy considerations to be pursued by simply delaying contracts or
reformulating them to better suit domestic bidders. The 'public interest' provision, which echoes an
identical provision in the old GPA, has never been interpreted in the GATT case-law. In part this may
reflect the fact that entities have absolute discretion to formulate notices with respect *o technical
specifications within the limits of Article VI. In principle, technical specifications must be based on
performance rather than descriptive criteria and on international standards where existing. But, this
requirement is qualified by the words where appropriate (see above). This 'appropriateness-test' is
another potential loophole in the GPA.
There is no obligation in the GPA to adequately motivate decisions. Such an obligation exists,
for example, in other WTO Agreements (e.g., the Subsidies Agreement. The GPA contains two
provisions that address this issue in substantiallydifferent ways. Article XVIII:2 states that: "Each entity
shall, on request from a supplier of a Party, promptly provide: pertinent informnationconcerning the
reasons why the supplier's applicationto qualify was rejected, why its existing qualification was brought
to an end and why it was not selected; and to an unsuccessful tenderer, pertinent information concerning
the reasons why its tender was not selected and on the characteristics and relative advantages of the tender
selected as well as the name of the winning tenderer". Article XIX:2 provides that:
The govermnent of an unsuccessful tenderer which is a Party to this Agreement may seek,
without prejudice to the provisions under Article XXII, such additional information on the
contract award as may be necessary to ensure that the procurement was made fairly and
impartially. To this end, the procuring government shall provide information on both the
characteristics and relative advantages of the winning tender and the contract price. Normally
this latter information may be disclosed by the government of the unsuccessful tenderer provided
7

it exercisesthis right with discretion. In cases wherereleaseof this informationwouldprejudice
competitionin futuretenders,this informationshallnotbe disclosedexceptafterconsultationwith
and agreementof the party whichgave the informationto the governmentof the unsuccessful
tenderer."
The needto motivatethereforebecomesoperativeonlyupon a requestof an unsuccessfultenderer
or an interventionof his/her governmentto this effect. As the publicationof the award of contracts
required under the GPA merely has to identify the successful tenderer (without any motivation),
justifications only need to be elaborated ex post facto following a formal request to this effect. This
approachis at odds withGATT-Agreements
on Subsidiesor Antidumpingandthe GATTcase-lawin this
context, whichrequiresmotivationof decisions.'2
While entities must operate within the limits prescribedby the Agreernent(s)(e.g., technical
specificationshave to be establishedea ante), the choiceof specificationsis entirelythe responsibilityof
the procuring entities. The only limit to their discretionis the obligationnot to create "unnecessary
obstaclesto internationaltrade' (ArticleVI: 1). The questionwhetherthe choice of specificationsis
necessaryor appropriatein order to achievethe desiredoutcomeappearsto escapejudicialreview,unless
the obligationimposedby ArticleVI: 1 is interpretedin a wide manner.

III.

Enforcement

There are manypossibilitiesthrough whichentitiesmay attemptto avoidthe GPA's obligations
on a de facto basis. 'Classic' tactics in this regard that have been brought forward in past GPA
Committeemeetingsare splitting of contractsto fall below the GPA's threshold,abuse of technical
specifications,short deadlines, non-publicationof calls for tender, and the use of limited tendering
(Hoeknan and Stem, 1993). Althoughthe new GPA makes renewedefforts to reducethe scope for
circumvention-e.g., through setting of deadh. ms;prohibitingsplitting [ArticleII:31, and establishing
detailedrules on the contentsof tender documentationand the award of contracts-withoutan effective
bid protest proceduresuch rules may not be very effectivein operationalterms.
An imnportant
innovationin the new GPA is thereforethe introductionof a challengeprocedure
(ArticleXX). The natureof procurementis suchthat most of the time, unlessrapidactioncan be taken,
inconsistencieswith theAgreementwill defacto be toleratedas finns will not havean interestin bringing
cases. The draftersof the new GPA attemptedto addressthe need for bid-protestmechanisms(long on
the agendaof negotiators)by the introductionof the challengeprocedures. Accordingto Article XX:7,
"challengeproceduresshall providefor:
121Seefor examplethe Panelreporton "Korea-Antidumping
Dutieson Importsof PolyacetalResinsfromthe
UnitedStates". ADP/92,adoptedon 29 April 1993, §209.
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(a) rapid interim measures to correct breaches oi the agreement and to preserve commercial
opportunities. Such action may result in suspension of the procurement process. However,
procedures may provide that overriding adverse consequences for the interests concerned,
including the public interest, may be taken into account in deciding whether such measures should
be applied. In such circumstances, just cause for not acting shall be provided in writing;
(b) an assessment and a possibility for a decision on the justification of the challenge; and
(c) correction of the breach of the Agreement or compensationfor the loss or damages suffered.
which may be limited to costs for tender preparation or protest.,,3
Viewed from a procedurAl/legalpoint of view this is a rare example in the WTO-system where
private parties can invoke WTO-law before domnesticcourts. Article XX requires contracting parties to
enact appropriate procedures in order to give effect to their assumed obligation; they have to guarantee
that challenges will be heard by a court or by an impartial and independent body that will respect the
minimmn of due process (Article XX:6)." This adjudication body however, whatever its form, is
required to apply the GPA: this stems unequivocally from the cited Article XX:7 according to which the
bodies will be required to provide rapid interim measures to correct breaches of the Agreement. Article
XX:8 specifies further that 'with a view to the preservation of the commercial and other interests
involved, the challenge procedure shall normally be completed in a timely fashion."
If viewed from the effectiveness/efficiency of remedies point of view, challenge procedures
constitute a step forward. The challenge procedures provide what was missing from the previous
Agreement, namely the possibility of speedy action against violations of GPA rules and disciplines. This
is probably their main contribution. Even in cases where panels are bold enough to suggest "restiuzio
in integrum"as a remedy for illegally awarded contracts, there is always the possibility of excessive
onerousness. Moreover, as a general rule, preventive action is, in principle, more effective than
corrective action er post.
There are possible negative implications however. These are related to the interpretation of the
GPA: in principle, all signatories have been put in a position to interpret the Agreement in what could
be divergent ways. Signatories of the GPA could provide the legal possibility to appeal at the domestic
level against decisions in this context. Moreover, signatories always retain the possibility to bring a case
before a GATT-panel if they believe that domestic courts have misinterpreted the GPA. To the extent

131It should be notedthat in their Annexessignatoriesmay make derogationson the applicabilityof Article
xx.
141 If not a court, a review body must be subjectto either judicial reviewor have proceduresprviding for
hearings,represenmtion,accessto all procdings, witnesses,wnitten dedsions and disclosureof documents.
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that GATT panel reports do not constitute binding precedents, nothing guarantees that a degree of
homogeneity in the case law in this area will be preserved, and thus legal security. This problem could
prove to be rather serious given that the basic object of the challenge procedures is to provide for timely
remedies. Any non-challenge in this context could theoretically amount to tolerance of inconsistencies
if the ruling of the Trondheim panel was adhered to in the future.'5 Consequently, much depends on
the diligence and the good faith of the signatories that put into place and apply the challenge procedures.
The GPA's dispute settlernent procedures are contained in Article XXII. Basically, the original
structure of consultations/panel procedures is preserved: recourse to panel procedures is an option if
bilateral consultations fail to produce a satisfactory result. Article XXII:1 slates that "the provisions of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes under the WTO
Agreement... shall be applicable except as otherwise specifically provided". What follows will
concentrate on the distinctive features of the GPA. Article XXII:2 recognizes two forms of legal
complaints: violation complaints, where the object of the dispute is an alleged violation of the Agreement
and non-violation complaints, where, notwithstanding the consistency of a particular measure with the
Agreement, rights and benefits of signatories have been nullified or impaired. Thus, the third form of
legal complaint known in the GATT legal system, the situation complaint, has been left out of the GPAcontext. This is a rather unimportant ornission, since it is difficult to imagine complaints other than
violation and non-violation.'6
All requests for establishment of Panels will be forwarded to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB),
the WTO-organ responsible for establishing panels, adopting panel and Appellate Body reports, making
recommendations or giving rulings on the matters before it, maintaining surveillance of implementation
of rulings and recommendations, and authorizing suspension of concessions and other obligations.
However, because the GPA is a 'plurilateral' agreement, members of the DSB are restricted to signatories
of the GPA when addressing disputes arising under GPA auspices.
Although the procedures established in the WTO-Understanding on Dispute Settlement are
applicable, an interesting particularity of the GPA concerns remedies. The WTO Understanding nowhere
specifies applicable remedies, implying that all public international law remedies are applicable in the
WTO-context. The GPA also refrains from specifying applicable remedies, so that all public international
law remedies are applicable here as well. The GPA goes beyond the WTO-Understanding, however, by

15/ As discussedin Mavroidis(1993),in the Trondheimcase the panel foundthat the procurementprocedures
that were employedviolatedthe GPA. However,the panel also concludedthat it was too late to remedythe
situafionand decidedto acceptan undertakingby Norway that the proceduresthat were followedwouldnot be
repeatedin the future.
161 Situationcomplaintshave never been pursuedin the GATT-context.Accordingto Petersmann(1991) they
havefallen in desuetude. Only in one instancehas there been a threat of bringinga situationcomplaintbefore a
panel (EC v. Japan), see Hoekmanand Mavroidis(1994).
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stating that the DSB shall have, inter alia, the competenceto authorize "consultations regarding remedies
when withdrawal of measures found to be in contravention of the Agreement is not possible" (Article
XXII:3). This provision appears to have been introduced because of the dissatisfaction of some
signatories with the panel ruling on the Trondheim case on remedies. 'While panels could normally be
expected to decide on the appropriateness of a particular remedy taking into account the facts of the case,
here the initiative is explicitly delegated to the parties to the dispute. It is difficultto justify this shift of
initiative on legal grounds, especially given that public international law remedies are not circumscribed
at all.
Article 3:7 of the WTO-Understanding states that "in the absence of a mutually agreed solution,
the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures
concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements'"*7
Article 3:7 reproduces a provision of the 1979 Understanding on Dispute Settlement. Although this
constituted a description of the 'state of the art' at that point in time, the WTO-Understanding is not an
agreed description of what customarily has happened in panel procedures. Since 1979 a number of panels
have gone beyond the 'usual' ex nunc GATT-remedy. 'Usual' remedies have been suggested in the
majority of the cases, but other, types of remedies have been recommended as well (e.g.,
reimbursement). It is nowhere implied that 'unusual' remedies create a presumption of inconsistency.
Since the Trondheim case, a number of signatories have revealed their dissatisfaction with panel rulings
tat were limited to ex nunc remedies in the GPA-ontext, presumably because of their ineffectiveness.
Additionally, members of the GPA can reach mutually acceptable, bilaterally negotiated solutions (see
above) that, in principle, can also go beyond the 'usual' remedy. It appears therefore that WTO-members
did not want to state explicitly what implicitly is already within the realm of competence of WTOadjudicating bodies with respect to remedies.
The provision allowing fcr bilaterally negotiated remedies could prove to be very interesting if
viewed as evidence of state practice in the field of remedies. Since the WTO-Understandingis applicable
if not superseded by the provisions of the GPA, an assessment of the legal value of such bilateral
solutions should start there. According to Article 3:6 of the WTO-Understanding "mutually agreed
solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the
covered agreements shall be notified to the DSB and the relevant Councils and Committees, where any
member may iaise any point relating thereto". Thus, GPA-signatories that have reached a biaeral
solution-after authorization by the DSB to initiate such consultations-will have to notify the outcome to
the DSB and the relevant Councils and Committees. The nature of the points that any member might
raise is not defined.

17/ Emphasisadded.
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What might happen in cases where a bilateral solution is reached and notified and some members
think it is inconsistent with the Agreement? Article 3:5 of the WTO-Understanding is relevant here,
where it is stated that all solutions to matters formally raised under the consultationand dispute settlement
procedures shall be consistent with the Agreements and shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to
any other member, nor shall they impede the attaimnent of any objective of the covered agreements.
Were one to interpret the two Articles in a way consistent with the obligations stemming from the
multilateral context, the starting point should be that only panels can pronounce on the consistency of
solutions reached. To judge otherwise would mean that consistency with the Agreement could be
established at the bilateral level. This, however, could in tum provide an impediment to reaching
bilateral solutions: Article 3:5 makes it clear that both systemic and trade interests could be taken into
account. Theoretically, one could imagine a situation where panels could be requested to examine the
consistency of remedies granted in a purely bilateral context that never reached the stage of panel
procedure. What is not specified though, is to what extent third parties have standing before a panel in
cases where bilateral solutions do not affect their trade interests. The crucial question in such cases will.
consequently, be the consistency of the remedies agreed at the bilateral level with The GPA. This might
constitute a future avenue for the WTO to embark on a serious-and unfortunately, still elusive-discussion
on remedies in the WTO-context.
Concerning the time-limits applicable in dispute settlement, the GPA contains a particularity
compared to the WTO-Understanding. Normal panel procedures should not exceed 6 months, with the
possibility of extension up to 9 months in specific circumstances. In the GPA a clause is inserted stating
that every effort shoul2 ' - -..ade to limit the duration of panel proceedings to 4 months, and to 7 months
at the very most. This is however, a best-edeavors clause, and, consequently, not legally binding.
Exceptions

Article XXII contains an exhaustive list of legal grounds that can justify action by the signatories
that is inconsistent with the Agreement. It is divided in two sub-paragraphs: (a) a national security
exception; and (b) a list of other justifications as long as they are not being 'applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the smne
conditions prevail or a disguised restriction in international trade". The list covers measures: (i)
necessary to protect public morals, order or safety; (ii) necessary to protect human, animal, plant life or
health; (iii) necessary to protect intellectual property; (iv) relating to the products or services of
handicapped persons, of philanthropic institutions or of prison labor. The GATI case law in this field
will be of relevance, particularly insofar as the "necessity" principle has been incorporated as the
appropriate criterion to judge actions taken by administrative authorities.
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IV.

DevelopingCountries and Expanding Membership

Membershipof the GPA is quite limited. As mentionedpreviously,the Agreementhas only 11
signatories(counting the EU as one). Although its Members account for a large share of global
governmentprocurement,the absenceof broad-basedparticipationis a source of concern. Duringthe
1980sit was probablyfair to say that muchof the problemwas the 'newness'of the GPA. But after 15
years,any uncertaintyregardingthepotentialbenefitsof participationshouldhave disappeared. The fact
thatMembershipremainsso limitedsuggeststhat non-Membersperceivethecosts ofjoining to outweigh
thebenefits. What is wrong with the GPA? Whatneeds to be doneto expandmembershipsignificantly?
These questions are important, not just because there is a large 'hole' in the GATT, as public
procurementcorLstitutesa large source of demandfor goods and servicesin most countries, but also
becausethe GeneralAgreementon Trade in Services(GATS)containsa provisioncallingfor negotiations
on governmentprocurementof servicesto be initiatedwitbintwo years of the entry into force of the
WVTO
(i.e., January 1997).'l'
The obvious hypothesisin this regard is that non-membersdesire to be able to discriminate
againstforeign products or supplierswhen awardingcontracts. The fact that attempts were made to
weakenthe reach of the GPA's non-discrimination
principlesfor developingcountriessuggeststhat this
is indeedthe case. Although in principleno discriminationis allowed in favor of domestic firms by
coveredentities, Article V:4 of the GPA allowsdevelopingcountriesto negotiate"mutally acceptable
exclusionsfrom the rules on nationaltreatmentwith respectto certainentities,products,or servicesthat
are includedin their lists of entities." Such negotiationsmay also be initiatedexpost, after signingthe
agreement(Article V:5). Somescope thereforeexists for, e.g., maintaininga price preferencepolicy.
However,the optionis limitedto certainentities,productsor services,and is thereforeinherentlylimited
by the relativenegotiatingpower of the countryseekingaccession.
Article XVI of the GPA allows developingcountries, at the time of accession, to negotiate
conditionsfor the use of offsets(e.g., domesticcontent requirements).This is a new provision, in that
the Tokyo round agreementhad only weak disciplineson the use of offsets." Under the new GPA
offsetshave been prohibitedfor industrializedcountries,but remainpossi'blefor developingcountries,
thus explicitly allowing for de facto discriminationagainst foreign suppliers. However, offset
requirementsmay only be used for qualificationto participatein the procurementprocess and not as
criteriafor awardingcontracts,andconditionsare to be objective,clearlydefinedand non-discriminatory.
Thus, althoughin principleallowed-if negotiatedduring accession-offsetsmay onlybe usedas necessary
18/ See Hoekman(1994) for a briefreviewof the GATS.
19/ Art. V:14(h)stated,interalia, that 'entitiesshouldnormallyrefrainfromawardingcontractson the
conditionthat the supplierprovideoffset ... opporunities ... In the limitednumberof cases where such
requisitesare part of a contract, Pardesconcernedshall limit the offset to a reasonableproportionwithinthe
contractvalue ..
13

conditions. If a firmnoffers local content that greatly exceeds the minimum required offered by its
competitors, this may not be a factor in awarding contracls. As offset policies are very prevalent in
developing countries. Article XVI appears to have been worded with the concerns of expanding
participation in mind. As disciplines on offsets were weak under the old code, however, Article XVI
does not constitutea new 'incentive' to join. Moreover, offsets are likely to be subject to negotiation.
Israel has committed itself in its Annex that the maximum local content required is 35 percent for the first
five years of the Agreement, dropping to 30 percent for the next four years, and 20 percent thereafter.
While offset requirements may be discriminatory in the sense that foreign firms are forced to use
more local inputs than might be optimal from a profit maximizing perspective, they apply to locally
established firms as well. A price preference policy discriminates more explicitly in favor of domestic
firms. Interestingly, the choice that was made to allow offsets but prohibit price preferences is the
opposite of what economic theory suggests regarding the welfare implications of these two policies.
Although a case can be made in favor of price preferences in certain circumstances, domestic content
provisions are usually inefficient instruments. As emphasized by McAfee and McMillan (1989),
discriminatory procurement policies may be welfare improving, depending on the market structure of the
industry and the type of good involved. In principle, nondiscriminatory procurement policies are
therefore not necessarily optimal. Procurement costs may be lowered by pursuing price preferences if
domestic firms have a competitive disadvantagein producing the product, and only a limited number of
firms (foreign and domestic) bid for the contract. In the absence of a preference policy, in such a context
foreign firms may exploit their cost advantageby bidding just below what they expect domestic firms to
bid, which will be substantially higher fian their actual cost. A price preference policy will force foreign
firms to lower their bids, as it increases the effective competition from domestic firns. While the
preference policy entails that the lowest bidder is not necessarily awarded the contract, thus implying
higher costs to the govermnent, on average the bids made by firms with a cost advantage may be lower
than otherwise. Of course, if domestic firms do not have a cost disadvantage, no preferential policy
should be pursued.21
Economicarguments for preferences only hold in a small ntunbers setting. If enough foreign and
domestic firms are invited to bid, competitionbetween them should ensure that the 'market' price is paid.

20/ The new GPAcontinuesto contain ratherextensivelanguageregardingspecialand differentialtreatmentof
develoning countries (Art. V). Thus allowance is made for such countries not to abide by the GPA's
nondiscrimination principles in order to safeguard the balance of payments; promote the development of local
industry; or to support industrial units "so long as they are substantially dependent on govermnent
procurement." AlthoLugh,these provisions are of a 'best endeavors' nature in the sense that Parties to the GPA
'shall, in the implementation and administration of this Agreement ... duly take into account" the foregoing
'needs', developing country signatories are given a substantial amount of discretion not to implement the GPA.
21/ It is ironic that the GPA does allow for discrimination against domestic finns, reflecting the adoption of the
GATT's definition of national treatment. This requires that policies are "no less favorable' for foreign firms
than what is applied to domestic ones, thus allowing preferential treatment for foreign products.
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In practice discriminatory government policies can be expectedto be more costly than a national treatment
policy, especially when no competitive tendering is sought or there is an absolute preference for domestic
suppliers. Indeed, if foreign firms are excluded from bidding for contracts procurement, costs are likely
to rise significantly. Without going into the pro's and con's of specific decision rules in this
connection,' what is relevant here is that criteria used in the enforcement of competition policy can be
used to determine when to discriminate. As market structure is crucial, and this is the focus of
competition enforcement, a competition office could be given the task to ascertain if the conditions calling
for discrimination have been met in individual cases. The point is that reliance on a general rule of
thumb (e.g., international competitive bidding for all contracts above a certain threshold) may not be
appropriate. But, to diverge from this principle, information/analysisis needed. For a price preference
scheme to reduce average procurement costs it is necessaryto obtain information on the costs of foreign
and domestic firms.
The impact of local content criteria on economic efficiency and welfare has been analyzed at
length in the theoretical and policy-oriented economic literature.' A general theme of this literature
is that there is a need to investigate whether the specific rule that is employed attains the policy goal at
least cost. In practice, the content requirements may not even be consistent with the underlying policy
goal. A local content scheme that is intended to protect domestic producers of intermediates is usually
an inferior instrument as alternatives exist that are less costly. Thus, it is w_l known that production
subsidies are generally the most efficient means of supporting a specific economic activity. Another
theme is that policymakers should consider economy-wideimplications. For example, while local content
requirements protect domestic (regional) intermediate goods producers, this raises the costs of production
for final good producers. By offering protection to producers of intermediates the probability increases
that producers of final goods and services that use these intermediates will also petition for protection.
Local content rules are often used as schemes under which tariff preferences are provided to
firns. Thus, if the content rule is met firms may be granted exemptions from-or reductions in-tariffs
on imported inputs. A key difference between such schemes and local content (offset) requirements in
the procurement setting is that in the latter case satisfying the offset requirement is a necessary condition
for contesting the market. The firm cannot choose to pay the tariff (or a higher tariff). As is well
known, such quantitative restrictions are much more distorting than price-based measuresqsuch as tariffs,
or in the case at hand, price preferences. Indeed, there is a direct analogy between price preferences and
offsets on the one hand, and tariffs and quotas on the other.
Tariffs are superior to quotas on economic groundsfor many reasons. These include their greater
transparency, less need for regulation and administration, and thus less scope for capture by vested

22/ Branco(1994)exploressome of the practical implicationsof this result for the designof tender procedures.
23/ See, e.g., Vousden (1990).
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imerests, and most importantly, the fact that a tariff will always allow the most efficient producers to
maintain their competitive edge vis-a-vis other suppliers. Even if the necessary conditions for a price
preference policy to he optimal have not been satisfied and a government simply desires to support local
industry, price preferences will be a more efficient instrument than offsets. It is unfortunate therefore-if
perhaps not surprising2 4 -that negotiators chose to allow defacto quantitative restriction-like instruments
instead of price-based measures.
The conditional-MFN approach based on reciprocal negotiation of entity lists ('market access')
is another possible culprit underlying continued limited membership of the GPA. Parties to the
Agreement have shown a tendency to define reciprocity on a sectoral basis. Absolute sectoral reciprocity
has been a norm, i.e., a country that schedules its teleconinunications provider(s) will seek to ensure that
other signatories do so as well. This makes cross-sectoral (cross-entity and/or cross-product) tradeoffs
more difficult, and reduces the potential gains from trade. For example, as mentioned earlier, a number
of signatories to the new GPA introduced sectoral non-application and/or reciprocity provisions (naaming
the Parties of the GPA to which these exemptions applied) in their Annexes listing the procurement of
services that would be subject to the GPA's rules. The objective of such provisions was the pursuit of
a sectoral 'level playing field': the Parties making exceptions in their Annexes sought to ensure that
market access conditions prevailing abroad would be at least as good as those implied by their own offer.
Some participants viewed these developments-which reflected the move towards sectoral reciprocity in
the GATS context-with serious misgivings. One signatory to the Tokyo round Agreement-Hong Kongfelt strongly enough about the resulting weakening of the GPA's nondiscrimination principle to refuse to
sign the new GPA (Messerlin, 1994).
What might be done to expand membership of the GPA, and ultimately to multilateralize the
Agreement? An argument can be made that the 'all or nothing' approach of the current GPA as regards
discrimination is both too purist (not allowing price preferences) and not purist enough (allowingoffsets;
allowing sectoral reciprocity). Two possibilities arise: (1) pursue 'conditional tariffication': allow price
preferences, subject to a determinationthat certain necessary conditions have been met (relating to market
structure, number of bidders, etc.); and (2) allow for tariffication of procurement preferences more
generally by developing countries. The first option is somewhat analogous to the pursuit of common
competition policy disciplines, and may therefore be subject to the general arguments that can be raised
against such efforts (see Hoekman and Mavroidis, 1994). However, as long as agreement can be reached
regarding the economics of the issue, progress along this dimension may well be feasible without
hannonization. Involvement of national competition-typebodies could be useful in the procurement area
by establishing if a case exists for allowing the use of price preferences. If disagreements arise as regards
determinations of these bodies, Members could invoke the GPA's dispute settlement procedures.

24/ Whenconfrontedwith the choicepolicymakersoftendemonstratea distinctpreferencefor regulationof
quantitiesrather than usingmore efficientprice-basedinstruments. See e.g., Messerlin(1981)and Deardorff
(1986).
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General tariffication is the more straightforward approach, of course, although not necessarily
the optimal one from an economic perspective.3 It's advantage is the absence of any need to determine
what the necessary conditions for using preferences are, and whether they have been met in particular
instances. Even though clearly not 'first-best', allowing for price preferences could prove to be the
simplest and most effective way of multilateralizing the GPA. Once countries have set/negotiated the
implicit tariffs (price preferences) that they will apply, these price wedges can become the subject of
periodic multilateral liberalization efforts (negotiating rounds). Tariffication can also do much to
overcome the 'absolute' sectoral reciprocity constraint that has affected GPA talks. Once 'tariffs' have
been set, negotiators can follow GATT's well-establishedtechniques of incremental liberalization, what
Bhagwati (1988) has called the 'first-difference' approach to reciprocity.
In allowing for discrimination through tariffication care should be taken that signatories do not
engage in opportunistic behavior by setting rates at stratospheric levels. But an analogy with agriculture
is perhaps appropriate here. Although tariffs may be bound at high levels, this may be worth it in terms
of subjecting this sector of activity to multilateral rules, especially if in the process the use of quantitative
measures (quotas in agriculture, offsets here) becomes circumscribed.
The potential gains from trade are pretty clear. Developing countries offer potential markets for
current signatories, whereas governments that are concerned with miimizing their budgetary outlays have
a stake in adopting procurement practices that maxnimizenational welfare. As in other areas, the key
issue appears to be one of information: often it may not be clear to policymakers what procurement policy
is the most beneficial. As is the case for services as regards the costs and benefits of regulatory regimes,
very little is known about the way that goods and services are procured by most governments, and the
opportunity costs of current practices. Indeed, often basic information on the practices and procedures
that are pursued are not readily available. Examples include the share of contracts that are awarded to
foreign suppliers; and the conditions that are actually inmposedin terms of local content or price
preferences on a case-by-case basis.
A 'transparency' body could therefore make a very useful contribution to policy formation by
evaluatingprocurement policies and practices. An obvious step in this direction would be to expand the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (IPRM) to procurement for those WTO Members that have signed the
GPA. The GPA already requires Parties to report statistics to the Committee that allow for an analysis
of sourcing practices. However, these data are not published, and have not been used for analytical
purposes. As was the case with the acceptance of the TPRM in 1988, although most countries will not

25( See Deardorffand Stem (1985) and Herander (1982)for an analysisof the tariff-equivalentof price
preferences. In gener a 10 percent preferencemay not be equivalentto a 10percent tariff for an entity
becauseentrpreneurs in thecountryhave an incetive to importgoods,proces them enoughto be considered
'local' and then sell them to the entity. For the economyas a whole, a 10 percentpreference wil only be
equivalentto a 10 percenttariff if the Govermententity is the only buyer of the product.
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have much desire to subject themselves to a transparency-basedreview of their procurement policies, the
benefit of obtaining information on trading partners may outweigh the perceived cost of being subjected
to review as well.
Before concluding, the question should be posed whether tariffication will be acceptable to OECD
and other high income countries that have objections to the GPA. Of the OECD countries, Australia,
Mexico, New Zealand and Turkey are not members of the GPA. Australia and New Zealand appear not
to have joined because they wish to maintain price preference policies (MacAfee and McMillan, 1989).
The same is probably true for Mexico and Turkey. Such countries could therefore support tariffication.
This may not be the case for countries that favor nondiscrimination. Singapore, a signatory of the Tokyo
round agreement, has not become a member of the n- GPA. Hong Kong, another member of the
Tokyo round code, also refused to sign, in part because it felt that the new GPA had weakened its
nondiscrimiination requirements too much (Messerlin, 1994).26 Tariffication will make the GPA
substantially less 'pure', and thus may not please those WTO Members that already perceive the
Agreement as being too weak. The elimination of the offset loophole and the a substantial expansion of
merrbership might, however, provide a counterweight for such Members.

V.

Concluding Remarks

The coverage of the GPA was significantly expanded as a result of the negotiations that were held
during the Uruguay round. Its enforcement provisions were strengthened, in particular by the
introduction of a bid-protest challenge mechanism. These are very innovative for the GATT-MTN system
in that they allow private parties (firms) to invoke the GPA before national courts. In the process,
however, potential problems have been created, due to the possibility of diverging interpretations of the
GPA by domestic courts. Time will tell whether this possibility is realized. Much was done to enhance
transparency of procurement practices of signatories. Further strengthening could be achieved by
requiring that the publication of contract awards (already required) include a brief motivation of decisions
(presently not required). Multilateral 'surveillance' of procurement practices could also be strengthened
substantiallyby giving the WTO Secretariat the mandate to analyze the statistics on procurement that are
submitted to the Comnnittee each year.
Membership of the GPA remains limited. Indeed, at the entry into force of the new GPA there
may be fewer signatories than at the beginning of the Uruguay Round. Inducing greater participation is

26/ Thenew GPAgives HongKongand Korea until January 1, 1997to applythe Agreement. However, Hong
Kongdecided in April 1994(just one week beforethe Mankesh meetingformallyconcludingthe Umguay
Round)not to join. It can be noted that the EU has statedin its annexesthat GPA rules for services
procurementwill only applyto Spanishentitiesas of January 1, 1997,and for Greek and Portugueseentitiesas
of January 1, 1998.
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important as procurement is the last major 'hole' in the GAIT. Addressing the issue of
'multilateralizing'the GPAshouldbe given priorityby policymakers.Publicprocurementconstitutesa
large sourceof demandfor goodsand servicesin most countries. Gettingdomesticprocurementpolicies
'right' thereforecan have largewelfareeffects. At the sametime, improvingdevelopingcountryaccess
to globalprocurementmarketscould help to induceGovernment'sto adoptmultilateralrules if thesecan
be shownto be in their interests. Perhapsthe most immediatesourceof urgencystemsfrom the General
Agreementon Trade in Services (GATS), which contains a provision calling for negotiationson
governmentprocurementof servicesto be initiatedwithintwo years of the entry into force of the WTO
(i.e., January 1997). The rules and proceduresthat are negotiatedwill be importantin determiningthe
potentialfor growthin developingcountryexports of services. The fact that the GPA was somewhat
'infected' by theGATS-whichtakesa sector-specificapproachto liberalization--through
the introduction
of sectoralnon-application
and reciprocityconditionsis worrisomein this connection.
Pursuit of tarifficationcould be an avenue through which membershipin the GPA can be
expandedin the future. In the process, the GPA couldbe improvedfrom an economicperspectiveby
elimninatingcurrent loopholes that allow for measures with quota-likeeffects, and weakening the
incentivesto pursue 'absolute' reciprocity. More generally,researchefforts are required to identify
possibleapproachestowardsextendingmultilateraldisciplinesfor procurementof goodsand servicesthat
will be beneficialto developingcountries,and thus be helpfulin formulatingnegotiatingpositionsand
strategies. Such researchshould emphasizetwo issues. The first is to anaiyze in greater depth the
economicsof the GPA's rules and disciplines,investigatewhat the impact of the Agreementhas been,
andexplorewhatmightbe done to expandits membership.The secondpertainsto obtaininginl.ormnation
on currentprocurementpoliciesin non-membercountriesandthe quantitativeimportanceof prucurement
markets in major selectedOECD and developingcountries.
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Table 1: Thresholdsin Annexes1.2 and 3 of the GPA
SpecialDrawingRights(SDR)
SDR I equals approx SUS1.4 (1994)

Austria

EC

Canada

Israel

Finland

Annex I
130,000
130,000
130,000
130,000
130,000
130,000
Goods
Servicesexcept
130,000
130,000
130,000
130,000
130,000
constructionservice 130,000
constiructionservices 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 5.000,000 8,500,000 4,500,000

Norway

Korea

Japan

US

CH

Sweden

130,000

130.000

130,000

130,000

130,000

130,000
5,000,000

130,000
5,000,000

130,000
5,000,000

130,000
5,000,000

130.000
5,000,000

_

_

Architect.

services:
_ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ _

_

_

_ _

___

_____

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _

450 ,000

_

_

_

_

_

Annex 2
200,000
200,000
200,000
250,000
200,000
200,000
355,000
200,000
Goods
Servicesexcept
200,000
200,000
200,000
250,000
200,000
200,000
355,000
constructionService 200,000
ConstructionServices 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 8,500,000 15,000,000 15,000,000 5,000,000
Architect.
services:
____________________

__________

~1,500,000

__________

_

_

_

_

_

_

Annex 1:
Annex2:
Annex3:

_

_

_

_

_

_

_

200,000

355,000

200,000
5,000,000

200,000
5,000,000

355,000
5,000,000

400,000

400,000

400,000
5,000,000

400,000
5,000,000

_

_

Central governmententities
Sub-centralgovermnententities
All other entitieswhichprocurein accordancewith the Agreement,in generalpublicenterprisesor public authoritiesor public authoritiessuch as Utilities.
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_

200,000

Annex 3
400,000
400,000
130,000
450,000
355,000
400,000
355,000
400,000
400,000
Goods
Servicesexcept
400,000
400,000
130,000
355,000
400,000
355,000
400,000
consiructionservices 400,000
Consiructionservices 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000 8,500,000 15,000,000 15,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000
Architect,
services:
450,000

_

_

_
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